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Menendez-Cordero v. State, 135 Nev. Adv. Op. 29 (Jul 25, 2019)1 
 
ANONYMOUS JURY, JURY INSTRUCTIONS, AND ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE 
 
Summary 
 
The Court concluded that (1) the empanelment of an anonymous jury does not, without 
actual prejudice, infringe on a defendant’s constitutional rights and the district court satisfied the 
abuse-of-discretion standard adopted; (2) the district court need not instruct a jury that is 
responsible for imposing a sentence in a first-degree murder case under NRS 175.552 about the 
effects of a deadly weapon enhancement; and (3) there was no abuse of discretion in the district 
court’s decision to admit Menendez-Cordero’s threats as consciousness-of-guilt evidence.  
 
Background 
 
 In 2010, Luis Alejandro Menendez-Cordero gathered with a group of friends and started 
playing cards. After the group started playing, Menendez-Cordero went outside and when he 
returned, shot Kevin Melendez and another guest before fleeing the crime scene. Both victims died 
from the gunshot wounds. The State learned that Menendez-Cordero was a member of MS-13 and 
a confidential informant told the State that he admitted to shooting the victims because one of them 
had disrespected MS-13.  
At a pretrial hearing, a special agent from the Federal Bureau of Investigation informed the 
court about the significance of tattoos within the MS-13 culture and identified multiple tattoos on 
Menendez-Cordero’s body that signify the commission of a crime. Before the trial, the district 
court also permitted into evidence two recorded conversations wherein Menendez-Cordero asked 
his associates to threaten a key witness. 
Having assessed the violent nature of MS-13, Menendez-Cordero’s attempt to obstruct 
justice, and the lengthy prison sentence he faced if convicted, the district court decided to empanel 
an anonymous jury and redact the jurors’ names and addresses from the juror questionnaires. The 
district court explained to the prospective jurors it was doing so to protect their privacy during the 
trial. Both parties had the opportunity to examine the prospective jurors for any biases and nothing 
suggests the district court limited the scope of questioning during this process.  
After a ten-day trial, the jury found Menendez-Cordero guilty on two counts of first-degree 
murder and found that he had used a deadly weapon in the commission of the crimes. During the 
penalty hearing, the district court instructed the jury that the sentence for the deadly weapon 
enhancement will be determined by the court at a later date. The jury sentenced  Menendez-Cordero 
to life without parole on each count, and the district court sentenced him to a consecutive term of 
20 years’ imprisonment for the use of a deadly weapon on each count. A timely appeal followed 
on the issues of (1) whether the district court abused its discretion when it empaneled an 
anonymous jury by withholding the jurors’ names and address from counsel; (2) whether the 
district court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the effect of a deadly weapon enhancement 
at the penalty hearing; and (3) the admission of Menendez-Cordero’s threats as consciousness-of-
guilt evidence.  
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Discussion 
 
Anonymous Jury 
 
 The Court adopted an abuse-of-discretion standard when addressing the issue of 
anonymous juries and concluded, absent actual prejudice, the empanelment of an anonymous jury 
does not infringe on a defendant’s constitutional rights. Yet, the Court is mindful that withholding 
certain biographical information may threaten a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an 
impartial jury2 or Fifth Amendment right to a presumption of innocence.3  Therefore, the Court 
emphasized that empaneling an anonymous jury is an unusual measure and should only be 
employed after careful consideration of the following factors:  
 
(1) there is a strong reason for concluding that it is 
necessary to enable the jury to perform its factfinding 
function, or to ensure juror protection; and (2) 
reasonable safeguards are adopted by the trial court 
to minimize any risk of infringement upon the 
fundamental rights of the accused. 
 
 In doing so, the Court declined to use the more demanding balancing test adopted in 
Stephens Media LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 125 Nev. 849, 862-63, 221 P.3d 1240, 
1250 (2009), believing that withholding biographical information of jurors does not encumber 
public access to criminal trials in a way that precludes fair administration of justice. Underlying 
the holding in Stephens Media was the recognition of the First Amendment pertaining to matters 
relating to the functioning of government.4 Menendez-Cordero’s concerns are not of the same 
constitutional dimension. His concern that withholding information interferes with a defendant’s 
ability to exercise peremptory challenges is not a constitutionally guaranteed right. As such, a 
defendant must show actual prejudice and Menendez-Cordero failed to do so. His second 
concern, that an anonymous jury threatens to erode a defendant’s presumption of innocence is 
flawed because it does not necessarily imply guilt. Jurors may be given a variety of reasons as to 
why they will be assigned anonymity. For these reasons, the Court concluded that, absent actual 
prejudice, the empanelment of the anonymous jury did not infringe on the defendant’s 
constitutional rights. 
 
There was a strong reason justifying empaneling an anonymous jury  
 
 Looking at the first part of the test, the Court considered:  
 
(1) The defendants’ involvement with organized 
crime; (2) the defendants’ participation in a group 
with the capacity to harm jurors; (3) the defendants’ 
past attempts to interfere with the judicial process or 
witnesses; (4) the potential that the defendants will 
 
2 United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 142 (2d Cir. 1979  
3 United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 971 (9th Cir. 2003).  
4 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980) 
suffer a lengthy incarceration if convicted; and (5) 
extensive publicity that could enhance the possibility 
that jurors’ names would become public and expose 
them to intimidation and harassment. 
 
 The Court does not view this list as exhaustive or dispositive, but merely instructive. The 
first factor is supported by the fact that Menendez-Cordero was involved with MS-13, a 
notoriously dangerous gang. As to the second factor, there is evidence that MS-13 has the 
capacity to harm jurors. Third, Menendez-Cordero interfered with the judicial process by asking 
his associates to intimidate a key witness and providing them with court documents. Fourth, 
Menendez-Cordero was charged with a double homicide and facing a lengthy prison sentence if 
convicted. And fifth, the local newspaper published a front-page article about the trial and its 
connection to MS-13. When combined, the Court concluded that there was a strong case-specific 
reason to believe the jurors and fact-finding process needed protection.  
 
 The district court took reasonable precautions to ensure that juror anonymity did not 
infringe on Menendez-Cordero’s fair trial rights.  
 
 Courts have held that a defendant’s right to an impartial jury is not infringed when it 
conducts a thorough voir dire designed to uncover bias. Additionally, a defendant’s presumption 
of innocence is not violated when the district court gives jurors a plausible and nonprejudicial 
reason for not disclosing their identities. Although this is a sufficient precaution, it is not a 
necessary one in Nevada. Therefore, absent an abuse of discretion, the Court will defer to the 
district court’s reasoning. Here, the Court concluded that the district court implemented 
reasonable safeguards by instructing the jurors that their anonymity was to protect them from 
public identification. Further, the district court only redacted the jurors’ names and addresses, 
and even invited counsel to view the unredacted questionnaires. The district court used 
precaution to ensure a thorough voir dire by both parties. As such, the Court held the district 
court did not abuse its discretion.  
 
 Jury instruction on Menendez-Cordero’s deadly weapon enhancement 
 
 The district court has broad discretion in settling jury instructions.5 Accordingly, this 
matter was reviewed for abuse of discretion or judicial error. The Court found none.  
 
 A defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction on sentencing enhancements, even when 
the same jury that determined the defendant’s guilt is responsible for imposing a sentence 
pursuant to NRS 175.552. Nevada law assigns this task to the district court and thus, there is no 
justification for mandating that the district court provide a jury instruction explaining the deadly 
weapon enhancement. In addition, the district court’s decision was not arbitrary. After hearing 
arguments from both parties, the district court concluded that Menendez-Cordero’s proposed jury 
instruction would be confusing. The Court held that while there is no statutory obligation to 
instruct a jury of the deadly weapon enhancement, it does not prohibit a district court from doing 
so. 
 
5 Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 748, 121 P.3d 582, 585 (2005). 
 Admission of Menendez-Cordero’s threats as consciousness-of-guilt evidence 
 
 The Court concluded that the district court’s decision to admit evidence of two recorded 
conversations where Menendez-Cordero asked his associates to threaten a key witness was not 
manifestly wrong. The district court did not abuse its discretion because it does not matter 
whether the threatening statement actually reached the party6 and its admission was probative. 
Evidence that a defendant threatened a witness with violence is directly relevant to the question 
of guilt.7 Moreover, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the district court abused its 
discretion in concluding that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by its 
cumulative nature. Because there was no manifest abuse of discretion, the Court deferred to the 
district court’s decision to admit Menendez-Cordero’s threats as consciousness-of-guilt evidence. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Adopting the abuse-of-discretion standard, the Court held that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion when it empaneled an anonymous jury. There is also no statutory obligation 
for a district court to instruct a jury on a deadly enhancement penalty. Lastly, the district court 
did not manifestly abuse its discretion in admitting Menendez-Cordero’s threats as 
consciousness-of-guilt evidence. For these reasons, the Court affirmed Menendez-Cordero’s 
judgment of conviction.  
 
  
 
6 Abram v. State, 95 Nev. 352, 356-57, 594 P.2d 1143, 1145 (1979). 
7 Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 628 28 P.3d 498, 512 (2001). 
